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INSURING THE RISK OF CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS IN
COLORADO: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S GREYSTONE DECISION
JESSE HOWARD WITt
MARCI M. ACHENBACH
ABSTRACT

Whether commercial general liability insurance policies cover
claims for construction defects has been the subject of debate for many
years in Colorado and across the United States. When a division of the
Colorado Court of Appeals ruled in 2009 that negligent work could not
give rise to a covered "occurrence" under the pertinent policy language,
the state legislature responded with a statute rejecting this view. Disputes
continued in the courts until late 2011, however, when the Tenth Circuit
reviewed a diversity case and predicted that the Colorado Supreme Court
would hold that standard liability policies do in fact cover unforeseen
damage to property arising from faulty workmanship. This Article examines the history of construction liability insurance policies, the interpretation of such policies in Colorado, and the Tenth Circuit's holding in
Greystone Construction,Inc. v. NationalFire & Marine InsuranceCo.
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INTRODUCTION

With its decision in Greystone Construction,Inc. v. National Fire&
Marine Insurance Co.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has greatly clarified the law of construction insurance in the State
of Colorado. The opinion, announced in late 2011, followed years of
fighting between policyholders and carriers in Colorado's state courts,
federal courts, and legislature. Underlying all of these battles was a fundamental dispute over whether builders' liability insurance policies could
cover property damage and construction defect claims arising from negligent work. Although this war is certainly not over, the Tenth Circuit's
decision represents a significant victory for policyholders.
I. HISTORY
A. ISO Policies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
The institution of insurance is at least as old as the earliest records
of human civilization in Greece, Rome, and China.2 Modem concepts of
business insurance date back to the Middle Ages, when traders sought a
means to offset the risk of hazardous maritime travel and other threats to
their property.3 In the late nineteenth century, however, a new form of
risk emerged: the civil judgment. As the Industrial Revolution brought
about trains, automobiles, and other new technologies wonderfully suited
to people hurting themselves, businesses sought to insure against the risk
that a court would order them to compensate third parties for bodily injury or property damage.4 This desire begat the modem commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.5
Until the 1930s, each insurance company drafted its own unique
policy language to cover potential liabilities, "resulting in little uniformity and a great deal of confusion and litigation." 6 These concerns prompted the various carriers to create an independent service agency to develop standardized language for all general liability policies. 7 This agency,
now known as the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), published its
first standardized liability policy in 1940 and has updated its policy
forms periodically since then.8

1.
2.

661 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 2011).
See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED

RULESOF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 6.3.1, at 756 (Aspen Law & Business rev. ed. 2002).
3. Id. at 756-57.
4. Id. at 758-59; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 87-88 (2001); James A. Robertson, How Umbrella Policies Started
Part 1: Early Liability Coverage, INT'L RISK MGMT. INST., INC.
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2000/robertsonO3.aspx.
5.
Abraham, supra note 4, at 89.
6.
SCOTT C. TURNER, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES

7.

Id

8.

Id

(Mar.

2000),

§ 1:5 (2012).
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Today, a few basic ISO forms define the scope of liability coverage
available for nearly all businesses throughout the United States, regardless of what type of work the business may do. 9 Although there would be
obvious advantages to creating specialized policies tailored to individual
industries, this approach would present challenges as well: whenever a
carrier seeks to adopt new policy language, it must first obtain approval
from the government of each state where the policy would have effect,
educate its employees on the meaning and application of the new language, and calculate premiums based on predictions of how courts may
interpret the policy in future disputes.'o Given these administrative hurdles, most insurers opt to use the standard, tested language." As one
commentator has noted, however, this results in a situation where "much
the same policy is issued to an earthmoving and excavating contractor as
to a wholesale bakery."' 2
The very first ISO liability policies were written to cover legal obligations arising out of injury or damage "caused by an accident." 3 Questions emerged, however, over whether an "accident" included harm that
took place over an extended period of time. To address such questions,
the ISO amended its standard policy language in 1966 to state that the
carrier must pay all "sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' .. .
caused by an 'occurrence' that takes place in the 'coverage territory."'l 4
The policy in turn defined "occurrence" to be "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."' 5 The 1973 revision defined "occurrence" in a similar
manner but added an element of fortuity, deeming an "occurrence" to be
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured." 6
Beginning with the 1986 revision, ISO policies have defined an
"'occurrence" as "an accident including continuous or repeated exposure
to substantially the same general harmful conditions," moving the "nei9. Id.
10. Id. As Turner notes, the McCarren Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012), delegates the
regulation of insurance policies to the states and territories, effectively requiring the ISO to obtain
the approval of fifty-three separate governments before adopting new language. See TURNER, supra
note 6.
I1.
For a further discussion of the forces encouraging standardization of insurance policies,
see I ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §§ 2.1-2.2,
at 189-202 (2d ed. 1996).
12.

TURNER, supra note 6.

13.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 74 (Wis. 2004) (quoting 16
HOLMES & RHODES, supra note I1, § 117.3, at 240).
14. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15.
Id. at 75-76 (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Clifford J. Shapiro & Neil B. Posner, It Was an Accident: Inadvertent Construction Defects Are an "Occurrence" Under Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies, 3 J. INS.
COVERAGE, Autumn 2000, at 55, 59 (quoting 1973 revision of CGL policy).

624

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 90:3

ther expected nor intended" language to the exclusions section of the
policy.17 The policies have never defined the word "accident," prompting
courts to look to common usage and dictionary definitions, which generally describe an accident as being something that happens by chance or
from an unknown or unexpected cause.' 8
As the policy language evolved, insured builders sought coverage
for the cost of repairing property that had sustained damage due to inadvertent defects in their workmanship. Although the 1966 and 1973 ISO
policies excluded coverage for damage to the "work" or "product" of the
named insured, some argued that such exclusions were inapplicable to
property damage included within the "Products-Completed Operations
Hazard" or similarly titled provisions, which the policies defined to
comprise property damage arising out of work that had been completed
or abandoned." Few courts of the era were persuaded, however.20 A
1971 law review article opined that the "business risk" exclusions of the
contemporary CGL policies were evidence that the ISO drafters had not
intended to cover the possibility that the policyholder might not perform
contractual obligations.
The products hazard and completed operations provisions are not
intended to cover damage to the insured's products or work project
out of which an accident arises. The risk intended to be insured is the
possibility that the goods, products or work of the insured, once relinquished or completed, will cause bodily injury or damage to prop-

erty other than to the product or completed work itself, and for which
the insured may be found liable. The insured, as a source of goods or
services, may be liable as a matter of contract law to make good on
products or work which is defective or otherwise unsuitable because
it is lacking in some capacity. This may even extend to an obligation
to completely replace or rebuild the deficient product or work. This
liability, however, is not what the coverages in question are designed
to protect against. The coverage is for tort liability for physical damages to others and not for contractual liability of the insured for eco-

17. TURNER, supranote 6, § 6:53 (quoting post-1986 policies).
18. Id. §6:54. Turner suggests that, because "accident" is subject to many possible meanings,
it is an ambiguous term that courts should interpret in whatever manner maximizes coverage for the
insured. See id. § 6:53. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, meanwhile, has cited two applicable definitions of this word:
The dictionary definition of "accident" is: "an event or condition occurring by chance or
arising from unknown or remote causes." Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as
follows: "The word 'accident,' in accident policies, means an event which takes place
without one's foresight or expectation. A result, though unexpected, is not an accident;
the means or cause must be accidental."
Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d at 76 (citations omitted).
19. See Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations: What Every Lawyer ShouldKnow, 50 NEB. L. REv. 415, 419-24 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522 F.2d 1207, 1211
(8th Cir. 1975); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235
(Minn. 1986); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 792 (N.J. 1979).
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nomic loss because the product or completed work is not that for
which the damaged person bargained.21
The Supreme Court of New Jersey quoted this article in a 1979 case,
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. ,22 in which the court concluded that an insurance carrier had no duty to defend allegations that an insured contractor was liable for replacing defective stucco and roofing materials.23 The
court then offered its own example to guide future litigants.
An illustration of this fundamental point may serve to mark the
boundaries between "business risks" and occurrences giving rise to
insurable liability. When a craftsman applies stucco to an exterior
wall of a home in a faulty manner and discoloration, peeling and
chipping result, the poorly-performed work will perforce have to be
replaced or repaired by the tradesman or by a surety. On the other
hand, should the stucco peel and fall from the wall, and thereby cause
injury to the homeowner or his neighbor standing below or to a passing automobile, an occurrence of harm arises which is the proper subject of risk-sharing as provided by the type of policy before us in this
case. The happenstance and extent of the latter liability is entirely
unpredictable the [sic] neighbor could suffer a scratched arm or a fatal blow to the skull from the peeling stonework. Whether the liability of the businessman is predicated upon warranty theory or, preferably and more accurately, upon tort concepts, injury to persons and
damage to other property constitute the risks intended to be covered
under the CGL.24
Notably, it does not appear that the plaintiffs in Weedo alleged that the
defects in the stucco and roofing products led to any water intrusion or
property damage within the home, so the court never reached the question of whether the policy would have covered damage to nondefective
components of a builder's work.25
In any event, though the reasoning of Weedo and similar cases may
have correctly interpreted the CGL policies of the time, it also suggested
that builders had little means of protecting themselves against liability
for subcontractor errors or other construction defects. Any modem business wants to insure against potential liability, and this gap in available
coverage presented a problem, both for the builders and the affected
property owners.26 The ISO addressed this problem in 1976 by offering a
21.
Henderson, supranote 19, at 441 (footnote omitted).
22.
405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979).
23.
Id.
24. Id. at 791-92.
25. Id. at 789.
26. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 85 ('The idea that businesses can insure against liability is
so axiomatic that it has very nearly become a form of legal reasoning itself."). The moral question of
whether society should allow tortfeasors to insure against civil liability is beyond the scope of this
Article, but one should not overlook that liability coverage exists both for the benefit of the insured
and also "for the protection of the innocent tort victim who suffers personal injury or property dam-
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new product, the "Broad Form Property Damage" endorsement.27 For an
additional premium, a builder could add this endorsement to its policy
and obtain coverage for liability arising from damage to the builder's
completed work that resulted from a subcontractor's errors. 28 Ten years
later, the ISO incorporated this language directly into its standard CGL
policy by narrowing the exclusion applicable to property damage within
the Products-Completed Operations Hazard.29 Policies written in 1986
and later, including those at issue in Greystone, expressly stated that the
exclusion for damage to an insured's completed work does not apply "if
the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on [the named insured's] behalf by a subcontractor." 30
Following publication of the 1986 revision, industry commentators
offered a new example of how the ISO drafters intended the contemporary CGL policy to apply in negligent construction cases.
The named insured is a general contractor who has built an apartment
house with the services of numerous subcontractors. After the building is completed and put to its intended use, a defect in the building's
wiring (put in by a subcontractor) causes the building, including
work of the general contractor and other subcontractors, to sustain
substantial fire damage. The named insured is sued by the building's
owner. Although the named insured's policy excludes damage to
"your work" arising out of it or any part of it, the second part of [the
exclusion] makes it clear that the exclusion does not apply to the
claim. That is because the work out of which the damage arose was
performed on the named insured's behalf by a subcontractor....

Thus, barring the application of some other exclusion or adverse policy condition, the loss should be covered, including the part out of
which the damage arose.
Nevertheless, disputes continued. Despite selling these new policies to
builders, some carriers balked at paying claims relating to subcontractors' defective work. Unable to convince courts that the new, more limited policy exclusions should bar coverage for defective work, these carriers shifted their strategy to the threshold question of whether defective
work constituted an "occurrence" in the first place.32 A number of courts
agreed, holding that there was no occurrence when faulty workmanship
age for which the insured is liable." Friedland v. Travelers Indem. Co., 105 P.3d 639, 646 (Colo.
2005). If an insolvent builder damages a home, for example, the homeowner's only recourse may be
to pursue the builder's insurance policy.
27. See Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2007).
28. Id.
29. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 83 (Wis. 2004).
30. Id. at 82.
31.
O'Shaughnessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2002) (quoting The
Nat'l Underwriter Co., Public Liability: Exclusions, FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BULLETINS, Sept.
1993, at Aa 16-17) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See Shapiro & Posner, supra note 16, at 56.
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damaged only itself and did not inflict any harm on the property of a
third party.33 Other courts reached the opposite conclusion and ruled that
accidental damage to an insured's own product could indeed constitute a
covered occurrence.34 These conflicting decisions presented a situation
that was, in the words of one court, an "intellectual mess."3 s
B. Meanwhile, in Colorado...
Interpretation of an insurance policy is, like interpretation of any
contract, a matter of state law. 36 Thus, even when considering identical
language in standard policies, courts in different states may reach different results. The opinion of Worsham Construction Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co. 37 illustrates this. In Worsham, a builder sought coverage under
its CGL policy for the cost of repairing construction defects in an office
building. 38 Reversing a grant of summary judgment for the carrier, the
Colorado Court of Appeals expressly rejected the business risk analysis
of Weedo and instead focused on the language of the policy, which the
court found to be ambiguous.39 One section of the policy excluded coverage for contractual liability but then stated that "this exclusion does not
apply to a warranty of fitness or quality of the named insured's products
or a warranty that work performed by or on behalf of the named insured
will be done in a workmanlike manner."40 This language, the court noted,
seemed to contemplate coverage for property damage resulting from a
breach of the builder's duty to perform its work in a non-negligent manner.41 Although the carrier argued that other sections of the policy excluded "property damages to the named insured's products arising out of
such products or any part of such products" as well as "property damage
to work performed by the named insured arising out of such work or any
portion thereof," the court concluded that these exclusions conflicted
with the former language and created an ambiguity that, under Colorado
law, had to be resolved in favor of the insured.42

33. See, e.g., J.Z.G. Resources, Inc. v. King, 987 F.2d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1993); AutoOwners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., 684 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Neb. 2004).
34. E.g., Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 523 (Alaska 1999); Sheets v. Brethren Mut.
Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 551 (Md. 1996); High Country Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 648
A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994).
35.
Edwin L. Doemberger & Theresa A. Guerin, Construction Defects as an "Occurrence":
State Legislatures Weigh In, COVERAGE, Nov./Dec. 2011, 18, 19 (quoting Crossmann Comtys. of
North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 26909, 2011 WL 93716 at *3 (S.C. Jan. 7,
2011), modified on reh'g,717 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 2011)). The original opinion that contained this pithy
quote has since been withdrawn, but it remains an apt description.
36. E.g., Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Am. Fence Co., 115 F.3d 805, 806 (10th Cir. 1997).
37.
687 P.2d 988, 991 (Colo. App. 1984).
38. Id. at 990.
39. Id. at 990-91.
40. Id. at 990.
41.
Id. at 991.
42. Id. at 990-91.
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Subsequent rulings in Colorado adhered to the reasoning of Worsham when deciding the applicability of these business risk exclusions to
construction damages.43 Some carriers countered with the argument that
the exclusions section of a policy could never expand their obligations,
under the theory that "an exception to an exclusion can never amount to
a grant of coverage but by nature, can only limit coverage."" In Simon v.
Shelter General Insurance Co., the Colorado Supreme Court justices
acknowledged "the technical merits" of this argument, but they were not
persuaded.45 The justices reiterated that insurance policies had to be read
as a whole and considered from the perspective of persons of ordinary
intelligence, not from the perspective of legal or insurance experts.46
With regard to whether damage from construction defects should be
treated as an occurrence under Colorado law, two lines of cases developed. Beginning with the Colorado Supreme Court's 1991 decision in
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,47 one line of cases
focused on "the knowledge and intent of the insured."4 8 If the result of
the insured's actions was not expected or intended, it would be covered
as an accident.49 Quoting the Second Circuit, the Hecla court explained:
In general, what make injuries or damages expected or intended rather than accidental are the knowledge and intent of the insured. It is
not enough that an insured was warned that damages might ensue
from its actions, or that, once warned, an insured decided to take a
calculated risk and proceed as before. Recovery will be barred only if
the insured intended the damages, or if it can be said that the damages were, in a broader sense, "intended" by the insured because the insured knew that the damages would flow directly and immediately
from its intentional act.50

43.
See, e.g., Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 236, 242 (Colo. 1992); Colard v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 709 P.2d I1, 14 (Colo. App. 1985). But see Union Ins. Co. v. Kjeldgaard, 820
P.2d 1183, 1187 (Colo. App. 1991) (noting that absent ambiguity, policy excluded coverage for
damage to insured's work).
44.
Simon, 842 P.2d at 240.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
Id. at 1088 (quoting City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150
48.
(2nd Cir.1989)).
49.
Id.
50. Id. (quoting City of Johnstown, 877 F.2d at 1150) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Some courts have employed the analogy of a speeding driver to explain this distinction. See, e.g.,
Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279-80 (Ct. App. 1989). A driver who is late
for an appointment may intentionally drive too fast and negligently cause a collision. His insurance
will still cover the damage because although the act of speeding was intentional, the damage was an
unintended accident. This contrasts with the scenario in which a driver deliberately runs over his
hated rival in a crosswalk. In the latter case, there is no coverage because the injury was the intended
result.
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The Colorado Court of Appeals relied on Hecla in 2005 when it decided Hoang v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn)LLC." The Monterra
Homes case arose after several homeowners had sued their builder, Monterra, in state court over construction defects. 52 Shortly before trial, Monterra's insurance carrier commenced a separate action in federal court
seeking a declaration that its policies would not cover any of the damages that the homeowners were seeking.53 The jury in the state court action
eventually returned a verdict in the homeowners' favor, at which point
the homeowners served the carrier with a writ of garnishment from the
state court. 54 The federal court then stayed the carrier's declaratory
judgment action because it concluded that it would be improper to grant
declaratory relief in relation to an ongoing state court garnishment suit.55
Recently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a similar order from a Kansas district court, and it appears unlikely that many federal judges in this circuit
will choose to grant declaratory relief concerning insurance lawsuits that
are actively pending in the state courts. 56
After the federal court declined to rule on the coverage issues in
MonterraHomes, the state trial court considered the evidence and found
that the property damage in question had in fact resulted from an occurrence. 57 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed:
Here, the trial court found that Monterra may have known, based
on the soil reports and other engineering reports, that there was a
substantial risk that damages would occur, but the evidence did not
show that Monterra actually intended or expected the damages....
Insurers maintain that, by focusing on the result rather than on the
knowledge and intent of the insured, the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in determining that there was an "occurrence" under the policies. A review of the court's order, however, demonstrates that the trial court properly focused its inquiry on Monterra's
knowledge, actions, and intentions.5

129 P.3d 1028, 1034 (Colo. App. 2005), revd sub nom. Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am.,
51.
149 P.3d 798 (Colo. 2007).
52. Id. at 1032, 1034.
53.
Id. at 1032.
54. Id.
55.
Order, No. 01-CV-2439 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2002) (copy of minute order on file with
author).
56. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Vill. at Deer Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 685 F.3d 977, 986
(10th Cir. 2012). Whether to grant relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§2201 (2012), is discretionary. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995). In addition
to the Monterra Homes litigation, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado has
declined to grant declaratory relief in at least two other unpublished rulings involving garnishments
over construction defect judgments. See Order Granting Defendants Motion to Stay, No. 04CV1924REBOES, 2005 WL 2359125, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2005); Order, No. 02-CV-0366-WDMBNB (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2002).
57. Monterra Homes, 129 P.3d at 1034.
58. Id.
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The court went on to hold that the policy covered portions of the judgment but that certain exclusions limited coverage.59
Both the homeowners and the insurers petitioned for a writ of certiorari, the former challenging whether any exclusions applied and the
latter arguing that the builder's faulty workmanship did not constitute an
occurrence. 60 The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow issue of whether an exclusion voided insurance coverage for property damage occurring when a claimant's predecessor in interest owned the
property, but it denied the remainder of the petition and cross-petition.
Such a denial is not necessarily an endorsement of the court of appeals's
decision, 62 though the supreme court's subsequent discussion of the nature and timing of an occurrence necessary to trigger coverage suggests
that the justices likely agreed with the lower courts' determination that
Monterra's accidental errors did indeed constitute an occurrence. 63
A second line of cases emerged with the opinions in Union Insurance Co. v. Hottenstein64 and McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. 6 5 In Hottenstein, a homeowner obtained an arbitration award against
a remodeling contractor for various sums, including the costs necessary
to complete the contractor's work, fix various defects, pay for lost use,
and repair damage to an existing roof 6 6 The contractor's carrier agreed
to pay for the roof damage but refused to cover the remaining amounts,
contending that these were breach-of-contract damages that its policy did
not cover. 67 In a 2003 opinion, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
summary judgment for the carrier.68 The court noted that the ambiguous
"exception to the contract exclusion" found in Simon (and Worsham) was
not present in the policy, and it rejected the homeowner's efforts to recharacterize her breach-of-contract judgment as one for negligence.6 9
The court further held that, based on decisions from the Eighth Circuit
and the Iowa Supreme Court, a contractor's breach of its construction
contract was not an accident that could constitute a covered occurrence
under the contractor's CGL policy. 70

59. Id. at 1039.
60. Plaintiffs and Defendant's Joint Reply Brief at 1, 10, Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149
P.3d 198, 800 (Colo. 2007) (No. 05SC389), 2006 WL 2618808, at *1, *10.
61.
Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., No. 05SC389, 2006 WL 1586645, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 20,
2006).
62. See COLO. APP. R. 35() ("Denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court shall not necessarily
be taken as approval of any opinion of the Court of Appeals.").
63.
See Hoang, 149 P.3d at 802.
64. 83 P.3d 1196 (Colo. App. 2003).
65.
100 P.3d 521 (Colo. App. 2004).
66. Hottenstein, 83 P.3d at 1198.
67. Id at 1201.
68. Id. at 1198.
69. Id at 1201.
70. Id. (citing Pace Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 177, 179-80 (8th Cir.
1991); Yegge v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 100, 102-03 (Iowa 1995)).
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McGowan, announced several months later, described similar facts.
A husband and wife hired a contractor to build a house but noticed a
number of serious defects during construction. 7 1 They eventually fired
the contractor and obtained a default judgment for breach of contract,
negligence, and other claims, and they attempted to collect on their
judgment from the contractor's insurance carrier.72 The trial court found
that the couple had alleged "property damage" resulting from an "occurrence" as the terms appeared in the relevant CGL policy, but that the
policy's exclusions barred coverage.73 The Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed. Relying indirectly on Tenth Circuit precedent, the court observed that "[c]omprehensive general liability policies normally exclude
coverage for faulty workmanship based on the rationale that poor workmanship is considered a business risk to be borne by the policyholder,
rather than a 'fortuitous event' entitling the insured to coverage."74 The
court further noted that CGL policies "are not intended to be the equivalent of performance bonds." 75 Turning to the specifics of the case, the
court held that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for damage
to the contractor's work unless it fell within the exception for completed
operations.76 Because the contractor had been fired in the midst of the
project and much of the damage reflected the cost of finishing the contractor's work, the "completed operations" exception did not apply, and
the exclusion controlled. 7 7 The Colorado Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.
Despite the very different outcomes, the lines of cases represented
by Monterra Homes and McGowan can be reconciled. The property
damage in Monterra Homes was an unexpected result of the insured de71.
72.
73.

McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 P.3d 521, 522 (Colo. App. 2004).
Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 523.

74.

Id at 525 (citing 9 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE

§

129:11, at 129-31 (3d ed. 1995) (citing Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 888 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Colo. 1995), affd, 1995 WL 539479, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 1995)). It is not clear if the
court's use of the adjective "comprehensive" in place of "commercial" was deliberate. The first ISO
policies bore the name of "Comprehensive General Liability" insurance; beginning with the 1986
revisions, the drafters kept the CGL initials but changed the name to "Commercial General Liability" insurance. See Abraham, supra note 4, at 89.
75. McGowan, 100 P.3d at 525 (citing Union Ins. Co. v. Hottenstein, 83 P.3d 1196, 1202-03
(Colo. App. 2003); Kvaemer Metals Div. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 825 A.2d 641, 655 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003)). A performance bond is an agreement by a third party to guarantee the completion
of a construction contract upon the default of the general contractor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1253 (9th ed. 2009).
76. McGowan, 100 P.3d at 525. Had the contractor abandoned the job instead of being terminated, the result may have been different. See Thomas v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. CV I1-40-M-DWMJCL, 2011 WL 4369519, at *10 (D. Mont. Aug. 24, 2011), report and recommendationadopted,No.
CV I 1-40-M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 4369496, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 19, 2011).
77. McGowan, 100 P.3d at 525-26. The insurance industry does offer another productbuilder's risk insurance-that provides first-party coverage for certain forms of property damage
arising prior to the completion or abandonment of a project, and prudent construction professionals
may wish to purchase both forms of coverage.
78. McGowan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 04SC354, 2004 WL 2377173, at *1 (Colo.
Oct. 25, 2004).
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veloper's negligence that appeared well after the completion of the project. By contrast, the unfinished work in McGowan was neither a traditional form of property damage nor anything that would typically be considered an accident. Although the appellate panel in McGowan suggested
that negligent work should never be considered an occurrence, and that
courts should interpret CGL policies to avoid overlap with performance
bonds, these comments were merely dicta; the holding of the case was
based on unambiguous exclusions for damage to the insured's incomplete work. Thus, these cases gave insured builders and their creditors
little reason to fear that Colorado courts would refuse to enforce CGL
insurance policies in future construction disputes. The situation changed
in 2009, however, when the Colorado Court of Appeals announced General Security Indemnity Co. v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.79
C. The General Security Case and ColoradoHouse Bill 10-1394
General Security arose from a large construction defect suit between a homeowners association and a builder.80 The builder asserted
third-party claims seeking indemnity from its subcontractors, and one of
these. subcontractors in turn filed a complaint against its own subcontractors (the sub-subcontractors). 8 ' After the original plaintiff and defendant
settled, this subcontractor's insurer, General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona (GSINDA), filed a separate action seeking contribution of
defense costs and other relief from the sub-subcontractors' insurers. 82 fn
a series of rulings, the trial court determined that the property damage
alleged by the homeowners association had not been caused by an occurrence, and it therefore dismissed GSINDA's claims.8 3
GSINDA appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed. 84 The judges acknowledged that another division of their court
had concluded that defective workmanship was an occurrence when deciding Monterra Homes, but they declined to follow this holding.85 Instead, they criticized the MonterraHomes division for failing to consider
case law from other states and follow what they characterized as the
"majority rule." 86 According to the GeneralSecurity division, a majority
of jurisdictions had held "that claims of poor workmanship, standing
79. 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), superseded by COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808 (2012), as
recognizedin TCD, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 296 P.3d 255 (Colo. App. 2012).
80. Id. at 531.
81.
Id.
82. Id
83.
Id at 532.
84. Id at 538.
85.
Id at 536.
86. Id How General Security selected its majority is unclear; the opinion identified five
jurisdictions as defining the "majority" yet listed six jurisdictions as representing the "minority." The
court's primary basis for this statement appeared to be an editorial written by an insurance industry
commentator who claimed to have collected cases from other states denying coverage, but the court
did not name the author's cases nor provide any further explanation of its dubious arithmetic. See id.
at 535.
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alone, are not occurrences that trigger coverage under CGL policies."87
Although the division acknowledged that "a corollary to the majority rule
is that an 'accident' and 'occurrence' are present when consequential
property damage has been inflicted upon a third party as a result of the
insured's activity," the judges found this corollary inapplicable to the
facts of the case.88 The judges likewise declined to follow Hecla, concluding that it was not binding because the Colorado Supreme Court had
considered a slightly different definition of "occurrence" in that case. 89
On its face, the GeneralSecurity decision seemed to invite certiorari
review by the Colorado Supreme Court under the criteria of the applicable state rule: the case decided a significant question of law in a manner
probably not in accord with the rationale of Hecla and similar supreme
court decisions, and it presented a conflict with Monterra Homes and
other divisions of the court of appeals. 90 Nevertheless, GSINDA chose
not to petition for review.
It is easy to speculate why GSINDA may have made this choice.
Some commentators have suggested that a dispute between two insurance companies, continuing after the original claimant and the insured
defendants have settled, presents a "poor forum for determining significant insurance coverage questions."9 1 This theory seems plausible, given
that an adversarial, common law system depends on parties aggressively
defending their own interests. In a dispute between two insurance carners at the appellate level, the system may fail insofar as a carrier may
face "the prospect of winning the coverage battle but losing the war if an
insured turns the insurer's winning coverage arguments against that insurer in a different case." 9 2 In other words, GSINDA may have decided
that a published opinion stating that carriers have no duty to pay con87. Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 537. Whether this was a valid basis for departing from binding precedent is likewise
dubious. As discussed above, the pre-1986 policy considered in Hecla included the language "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" as part of the definition of an "occurrence," whereas post-1986 policies moved this language to the exclusions. See TURNER, supra note
6, § 9:1 (quoting the pre-1986 policy) (internal quotation mark omitted). Although this change may
have the procedural effect of shifting the burden of proof to the carrier, see id., it does little to suggest that the concept of accident considered in Hecla has been superseded. On the contrary, commentators have noted that "the industry still equates an occurrence with the insured neither expecting
nor intending the injury or damage." Harmon S. Graves et al., Shoddy Work, Negligent Construction,
andReconciling the Irreconcilable Under the CGL Policies, 38 COLO. LAW., Nov. 2009, at 43, 46 &
n. 48 (citing The Nat'l Underwriter Co., Public Liability: CGL Coverage Form-CoverageA; Bodily
Injury and Property Damage Liability, FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BULLETINS, July 2008, at A.3-

4).
90. Colorado appellate rules provide that the character of reasons for granting certiorari include, inter alia, situations where the court of appeals has "decided a question of substance in a way
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court," and situations where a
division of the court of appeals has rendered a "decision . .. in conflict with another [division of said
court]." COLO. APP. R. 49.
Graves et al., supra note 89, at 44.
91.
92. Id at 44 n.2.
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struction defect claims would be worth more in the long run than whatever damages it might have recovered from the sub-subcontractors' insurers had it convinced the supreme court to reverse the GeneralSecurity
holding.
In any event, the General Security ruling soon received criticism
from both sides of the coverage universe. Representatives of policyholders complained that the decision departed from established Colorado
precedent, went against the intent of the ISO drafters, rendered portions
of the CGL policy superfluous, and created uncertainty as to what construction damages were covered. 9 3 Lobbyists for the insurance industry,
in turn, testified that GeneralSecurity and related cases "took it too far,"
came as a "shock" to the industry, and were "not the way courts have
ruled in other jurisdictions." 94
Although GSINDA was content to let the published decision stand
without further review, Colorado's legislators were not. In the following
session, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 10-1394,
which unequivocally rejected the "majority rule" that had enamored the
court in General Security.9 5 The legislators declared that "[t]he interpretation of insurance policies issued to construction professionals is of vital
importance to the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Colorado," and stated:
(1)The policy of Colorado favors the interpretation of insurance
coverage broadly for the insured.
(II) The long-standing and continuing policy of Colorado favors a
broad interpretation of an insurer's duty to defend the insured under
liability insurance policies and that this duty is a first-party benefit to
and claim on behalf of the insured.
(III) The decision of the Colorado court of appeals in General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona v. Mountain States Mutual

Casualty Company does not properly consider a construction professional's reasonable expectation that an insurer would defend the construction professional against an action or notice of claim [for con96
struction defects].
The bill, eventually codified at section 13-20-808 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, took effect in May 2010 and applied to "insurance policies currently in existence or issued on or after the effective date of this
93.
Id. at 47.
94. Ronald M. Sandgrund & Scott F. Sullan, H.B. 10-1394: New Law Governing Insurance
Coverage for Construction Defect Claims, 39 COLO. LAW., Aug. 2010, at 89, 90 (quoting House
Testimony on H.B. 10-1394 Before the H. Comm. on Bus. Affairs & Labor, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. 21:2-11 (2010)).
95.
See H.B. 10-1394, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010) (codified at COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 13-20-808, 10-4-110.4).
96. H.B. 10-1394 § I (citation omitted).
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act." 97 Since then, several other states have followed suit, enacting similar legislation." Before the bill became law, however, several state and
federal courts in Colorado relied on the GeneralSecurity holding to deny
coverage to insured builders. One such case was Greystone Construction,
Inc. v. NationalFire & MarineInsurance Co.99
II. THE GREYSTONE LITIGATION
A. Backgroundand ProceduralPosture
Greystone arose out of two state court cases in which homeowners
had sued their builders for construction defects, including foundation
movement that caused extensive damage to the homes' living areas.' 00 In
both cases, the homebuilders had used subcontractors to perform most, if
not all, of their work.'0 American Family Mutual Insurance Company
(American Family) had insured the builders during the time of construction and shortly thereafter, and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company (National Fire) had issued policies covering later dates. 10 2 In both
cases, American Family had tendered a defense to the homebuilders subject to a reservation of rights. 0 3 National Fire denied owing the homebuilders any defense under its policies, and American Family eventually
paid to settle both cases.10
American Family and the homebuilders subsequently sued National
Fire in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. They
alleged jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and asserted claims
for declaratory relief, contribution or equitable subrogation, breach of
contract, bad faith breach of contract, and violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. 05 The court bifurcated the issue of policy interpretation, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking
a determination of whether the underlying cases had alleged an occurrence that fell within the coverage provisions of the policies.'06 Relying
heavily on General Security, the district court ruled that there was no
occurrence to trigger coverage under National Fire's policies because the

97. Id. § 3.
98. See Doemberger & Guerin, supra note 35, at 20-22; accord ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79155 (2011); HAw. REV. STAT. §431:1-217 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §38-61-70 (2011).
99. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'1 Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1219 (D.
Colo. 2009).
100.
Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'1 Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir.
2011), vacated, 661 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2011).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Greystone, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
105.
Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, 6-10, Greysone, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1213 (No. 07-cv00066-MSK-CBS), 2007 WL 703348, at *2, *6-10.
106.
Greystone, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1215-16.
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underlying complaints had not alleged property damage to anything other
than the insureds' own work.'0o
B. Appeal to the Tenth Circuit

Following the district court's ruling, American Family and the
homebuilders appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Because the Colorado state
courts had not issued a clear ruling on the subject, the Tenth Circuit certified a question to the Colorado Supreme Court: "Is damage to nondefective portions of a structure caused by conditions resulting from a
subcontractor's defective work product a covered 'occurrence' under
Colorado law?"108 The Supreme Court declined to consider the issue.109
House Bill 10-1394 passed in the midst of the appeal, and the Tenth
Circuit permitted additional briefing on the new statute before announcing its final decision in November 2011.110
1. The Policies
To start its discussion, the court noted that the National Fire policies
at issue were all versions of the post-1986 CGL policy, which contained
the same material language:
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property
damage" to which this insurance applies. We will have [no] duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily in-

jury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply ....
b.This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "property damage"
only if:

(1) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" is caused
by an "occurrence" that takes place in the "coverage territory ";
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage occurs during the policy period ... .

The court also noted that the policies contained various business risk
exclusions, including the "your work" exclusion that barred coverage for

107. Id. at 1219-20.
108. Certification of Question of State Law at 1, Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1276 (No. 09-1412),
2010 WL 5776109, at *1.
109. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1277.
110. See id.
Ill. Id. at 1277-78 (footnote omitted) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it did not affect the holding, the court appears to have misquoted a portion of the
policy.
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"[p]roperty damage" to "your work" arising out of it or any part of
it and included in the "products-completed operations hazard."
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out
of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor. 1 12
The policies defined an "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions" but contained no definition of "accident."'"
2. Applicability of Section 13-20-808
The Greystone court first asked, "Does § 13-20-808, which defines
the term 'accident' for purposes of Colorado insurance law, apply retroactively to this case?" 1l 4 The court acknowledged that, if the statute applied, it "would settle this appeal."" 5
Considering the text of the statute, the court observed that the Colorado legislature had expressly rejected General Security and established
a definition of "accident" that required courts interpreting CGL policies
to "presume that the work of a construction professional that results in
property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is
an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the
insured.""'6
The court also noted that the statute's enabling act provided that it
applied to all insurance policies "currently in existence" at the time the
statute took effect, but the court questioned how to interpret this language in the context of an occurrence policy.1 7 Such policies typically
apply for a specified period of time and provide coverage for any damage
that occurs during that period, even if a claim is not made until years
later. "In this way, an occurrence policy does not expire, but, rather, continues in effect after the policy period ends.""" After reviewing Colorado
law regarding retroactive application of statutes, the Tenth Circuit determined that despite the legislature's directive, there was no clear intent to
apply the statute to policies where the policy period had expired."' The
court therefore declined to apply section 13-20-808 to the Greystone
dispute.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
2006).
119.

Id. at 1278 (footnotes omitted) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting CGL policy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808(3) (2012)).
Id. at 1280.
Vill. Homes of Colo., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 148 P.3d 293, 296 (Colo. App.
Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1280.
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3. Whether the Builders' Negligence Created an "Occurrence"
Having decided that the new statute was inapplicable, the Tenth
Circuit then considered whether property damage arising from poor
workmanship could give rise to an occurrence under existing state law
and the policy language.120
The court acknowledged that there was no consensus among federal
and state courts on this issue, and it began its analysis by looking to the
Colorado Court of Appeals's most recent decision on the subject, General Security, which had concluded that "a claim for damages arising
from poor workmanship, standing alone, does not allege an accident that
constitutes a covered occurrence."' 2 ' The Tenth Circuit panel noted that
it found this interpretation to be persuasive, but it also recognized that
federal courts are not bound by the rulings of intermediate state courts
when there is convincing evidence that the state's highest court would
decide otherwise. 122 The judges then made their key decision: notwithstanding their own agreement with much of General Security's reasoning, they "predict[ed that] the Colorado Supreme Court would construe
the term 'occurrence,' as contained in standard-form CGL policies, to
encompass unforeseeable damage to nondefective property arising from
faulty workmanship." 23
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit first examined the approaches taken by other jurisdictions as to whether damage caused by
faulty workmanship constitutes an occurrence under a standard CGL
policy.1 24 The court noted that the General Security opinion, despite its
statements to the contrary, had not actually followed the majority view;
in reality, most federal and state courts had found an occurrence under
similar circumstances, and the more "recent trend . . . interprets the term

'occurrence' to encompass unanticipated damage to nondefective property resulting from poor workmanship." 25 The court rejected the argument
that damage arising from defective construction can never be a covered
"occurrence," because this view "creates a fundamental inconsistency
with the logic of CGL policies" insofar as it renders other policy provisions, such as the your work exclusion, superfluous.' 26
Next, the Tenth Circuit held that "injuries flowing from improper or
faulty workmanship constitute an occurrence so long as the resulting
damage is to nondefective property, and is caused without expectation or
120. Id. at 1281.
121.
Id. (quoting General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 534
(Colo. App. 2009)).
122. Id. at 1281-82 (citing United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, 633 F.3d
951, 957 (10th Cir. 2011) (declining to follow GeneralSecurity on other grounds)).
123. Id. at 1282.
124. Id. at 1282-83.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1283.
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foresight."l 27 The court rejected General Security's definition of "accident" as requiring "an element of 'fortuity,"' calling this "an overly narrow view of CGL-policy language" that would be "inconsistent with the
inherent structure of CGL policies." 28 The court examined prior Colorado appellate law in McGowan, Hottenstein, and Monterra Homes and
found that "fortuity is not the sole prerequisite to finding an accident
under a CGL policy. To the contrary, an unanticipatedor unforeseeable
injury to person or property-even in the absence of true fortuity-may
be an accident and, therefore, a covered occurrence." 2 9 The court also
relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Hecla, which had
concluded that under similar policy language, "damages were covered
because the term 'occurrence' excludes from coverage only 'those damknew would flow directly and immediatelyfrom its
ages that the insured
30
intentionalact.""
To bolster its ruling, the Tenth Circuit also considered the history
and evolution of CGL policies and noted how the current policy language arose from the desire "to provide general contractors with at least
some insurance coverage for damage caused by the faulty workmanship
of their subcontractors."' 3 ' The court found that the subcontractor exception that the ISO added to the your work exclusion in 1986 was particularly instructive.132 This language "specifically contemplated coverage
for property damage caused by a subcontractor's defective performance."l 3 3 The court observed that insurance carriers can remove this
language from future policies or add a specific endorsement limiting
coverage if they decide that they no longer wish to insure such losses.' 34
By contrast, General Security's approach of not allowing coverage
where a subcontractor causes the damage to nondefective property "renders the 'your work' exclusion a phantom" in light of the subcontractor
exception included in the standard-form CGL policies.' 35 The court
acknowledged the importance of the exclusions in CGL policies to limit
the initial broad grant of coverage and recognized that the exceptions, in
turn, narrow the exclusions' scope to restore coverage under the original
grant. 36 Under the logic of General Security, the Tenth Circuit conclud127. Id. at 1284.
128.
Id.
129. Id. at1284-85.
130. Id. at 1285 (quoting Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo.
1991)).
131.
Id.
132. See id. at1288.
133. Id. (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.
2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
134. Id. (noting that the ISO now publishes an optional endorsement eliminating the subcontractor exception from coverage).
135.
Id. at 1289.
Id. (citing David Dekker, et al., The Expansion of Insurance Coverage for Defective
136.
Construction,28 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 19, 19-20 (2008)).
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ed that "the 'your work' exclusion and the subcontractor exception are
illusory if damages to the contractor's nondefective work productwhether caused by poor workmanship or otherwise-are not covered in
the first place." 37 By rejecting this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit judges thus gave effect to the your work exclusion, which, in their view,
could only apply if the "physical injury caused by poor workmanshipwhether to some part of the work itself or third-party property-may be
an occurrence under standard CGL policies."' 38
The Tenth Circuit also observed that "interpreting a CGL policy so
as to provide coverage for a subcontractor's faulty workmanship does not
transform the policy into a performance bond." 39 The court noted that a
CGL policy has different traits and protects other parties, and that, ultimately, "even if the CGL policy does share some characteristics of a
performance bond, that alone is an insufficient reason to ignore the plain
language and intent of the policy." 40
The court declined to consider whether any exclusions might alternatively bar coverage, remanding the case to the district court to decide
this question and any other issues.141
4. Defective and Nondefective Property
Although the central holding of Greystone correctly interpreted the
intent of the ISO drafters, the court's conclusion that only damage to
nondefective property presents an occurrence is curious. The express
language of a standard CGL policy does not make this distinction, but
the Tenth Circuit nevertheless held that "CGL policies implicitly distinguish between damage to nondefective work product and damage to defective work product." 42 The court based this conclusion on the premise
that the "obligation to repair defective work is neither unexpected nor
unforeseen under the terms of the construction contract or the CGL policies," 43 and "the recognition that the faulty workmanship, standing
alone, is not caused by an accident-but that damage to other property
caused by the faulty workmanship (including both the nondefective work
product of the contractor and third-party property) is the result of an accident."'" In Greystone, this meant that the damage to the homes was
covered, but that damage to the exterior drainage and structural systems
was not, because these repairs represented "an economic loss that does

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1288.
140. Id. at 1288-89.
141.
Id. at 1290.
142. Id. at 1286 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 1286 (noting that this reasoning is also in line with the Fourth Circuit's holding in
French v. Assurance Co. ofAm., 448 F.3d 693, 703 (4th Cir. 2006)).
144. Id. at 1287.
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not trigger a duty to defend under the CGL policies."l4 5 The court noted
that its ruling was thus largely consistent with GeneralSecurity's "corollary rule," which had recognized that "injury to third-party property may
be covered" under a CGL policy.14 6
Some have suggested that this portion of the Greystone opinion is
an "ancillary holding" that conflicts with the underlying logic of the
case.14 7 Regardless of its reasoning, this aspect of the case leaves several
questions unanswered, not the least of which is whether the court meant
to establish a subjective test for coverage that takes into account the
knowledge and intent of the insured, or whether the court contemplated
an objective analysis limited to the components of property involved. For
example, an insured builder seeking coverage for a subcontractor's defective work might argue that Greystone adopts the foreseeability test of
Hecla, and that the cost of repairing such work is not foreseeable under
the Hecla standard unless the builder actually knew of the subcontractor's errors.14 8 In response, the carrier might argue that the builder's
knowledge is irrelevant because the implicit exclusion for damage to
defective property recognized in Geystone is independent of such
facts.149 How the courts will resolve questions like this remains to be
seen.
III. THE EFFECT OF GREYSTONE ON FUTURE CASES

Although federal court decisions ate generally not binding on state
tribunals, the Colorado Supreme Court's reluctance to revisit this issue
means that Greystone will likely define the law of construction insurance
in Colorado for the immediate future.150 The Colorado Court of Appeals
has, in fact, already relied on Greystone in two published decisions.

145.
146.
P.3d 529,
147.

Id. (citingFrench,448 F.3d at 703).
Id. at 1287 (citing Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205
535 (Colo. App. 2009)).
See Ronald M. Sandgrund, Greystone and Insurance Coveragefor "Get to" and "Rip and

Tear" Expenses, 41 COLO. LAW. 69, 71 (2012).

148. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272, 1286 (10th Cir.
2004); see also Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 1991) (noting that
the fact that an insured was warned of possible damage or decided to take a calculated risk does not
mean that there was no accidental occurrence under CGL policy).
149. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1286-87.
150. As discussed above, the Colorado Supreme Court has denied petitions for certiorari review of what constitutes an occurrence in at least three construction cases over the last decade:
Greystone, Hoang, and McGowan. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1277; Hoang v. Assurance Co. of
Am., No. 05SC389, 2006 WL 1586645, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 20,2006); McGowan v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., No. 04SC354, 2004 WL 2377173, at *1 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004). Recently, the court denied a
fourth petition in the TCD case discussed below, in which the plaintiff had argued that the Colorado
Court of Appeals improperly relied on General Security to conclude that allegations of construction
defects did not suggest an occurrence that triggered a carrier's duty to defend. TCD, Inc. v. Am.
Fam. Mutual Ins. Co., No. 12SC351, 2013 WL 673985, at *1 (Colo. Feb. 25, 2013). At the time of
this writing, a fifth petition relating to this issue is pending in the ColoradoPool case, also discussed
below. Petition for Certiorari, Colorado Pool Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 2012SC1000 (on
file with author).
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In TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,"' the court
of appeals reviewed an order granting summary judgment to a carrier
that had argued that it had no duty to defend a contractor accused of installing a defective roof. 15 2 The court expressly noted that section 13-20808 had superseded General Security, but it declined to apply the statute
to the policies in question because their coverage periods had ended prior
to the statute's enactment, and the court found no legislative intent to
apply the statute retroactively.15 3 The court observed that the "corollary
rule" from General Security was similar to the conclusion from Greystone that "an 'accident' and 'occurrence' are present when consequential property damage has been inflicted upon a third party as a result of
the insured's activity."15 4 The court determined that this rule did not apply, however, because the parties had not alleged any consequential
damage to any third party or to any nondefective property, and it therefore affirmed the judgment. 5
Several months later, another division of the court of appeals announced Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., 156 in
which a carrier had refused to defend or indemnify a contractor accused
of installing rebar too close to the surface of a concrete swimming
pool.1 57 The division in Colorado Pool took a different view of section 13-20-808 and recognized that the state legislature had indeed intended to apply the statute retroactively, noting that its enabling act expressly provided that the law "applies to all insurance policies currently
in existence or issued on or after the effective date of this act,"' 8 and that
the statute itself provided that its purpose was to "to guide pending actions, on policies that have been issued." 59 Nevertheless, the court concluded that application of the statute to policies created before passage of
section 13-20-808 would violate the Colorado constitution's prohibition
of retrospective laws that impair vested rights, create new obligations,
impose new duties, or attach new disabilities to transactions that have
already occurred.16 0
Having concluded that section 13-20-808 did not apply, the court
then considered how to interpret the policy under Colorado common law.
The contractor argued that Hoang should control, whereas the carrier
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relied on General Security.16' The court held that neither of these decisions had properly considered all of the policy terms, and that the proper
test for coverage was that defined by the Tenth Circuit in Greystone.162
The court discussed the Greystone holding in detail and recognized that
"injuries flowing from improper or faulty workmanship constitute an
'occurrence' so long as the resulting damage is to nondefective property,
and is caused without expectation or foresight," regardless of whether the
resulting damage is to the insured's own work or to the work of a third
party.163 Applying the Greystone test to the facts of the case, the court
held that the contractor's policy did not cover the cost of replacing the
defective pool itself, but that the policy did cover the cost of repairing
other property that had been damaged during the course of replacing the
pool.16 The trial court had therefore erred by granting summary judgment.
Colorado Pool is significant for two main reasons. First, by explicitly identifying Greystone as the correct test for determining CGL policy
coverage, the Colorado Court of Appeals has effectively made the federal Greystone opinion binding on state trial courts.16 5 Second, the opinion
interprets Greystone to require carriers to indemnify the cost of repairing
what some commentators have called "rip and tear" expenses: the cost of
ripping and tearing out undamaged property in order to access the insured's defective work.' 66 In Colorado Pool, the court found that this
damage included the cost of removing a pool deck, sidewalk, retaining
wall, and electric conduits; none of these components was initially damaged or defective, but each stood in the way of the pool materials that the
contractor was legally obligated to replace, and each became damaged in
the course of the ensuing repairs.167 This is a noteworthy analytical shift,
insofar as it arguably extends coverage to some intentional property
damage necessary to correct an unintentional defect.168
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Id 145 (quoting Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272,
1284 (10th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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165. See COLO. APP. R. 35(f) (mandating that published opinions of the Colorado Court of
Appeals "shall be followed as precedent by the trial judges of the state of Colorado").
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Cases such as this may invite tedious distinctions as courts try to distinguish whether
certain elements of property damage result from the alleged occurrence itself or from the repair of
said occurrence. Compare Dewitt Constr. Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that CGL policy covered cost of demolishing nondefective work during repair of
defective property), with Desert Mountain Props. Ltd. P'ship. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 236 P.3d
421, 441-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that there was no coverage for "get to" expenses associated with repair of defect), aff'd, 250 P.3d 196 (Ariz. 2011); see also Sandgrund, supra note 147, at
73 & nn.41-42 (collecting cases). Some courts have sidestepped this question by relying on the
policies' alternate definition of "property damage," which includes loss of use of property that has
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CONCLUSION

In a diversity action such as Greystone, federal courts apply the
substantive law of the forum state. 69 It has thus been said that "[t]here is
no federal general common law." 1 70 Nevertheless, in the course of applying state insurance law, the judges of the Tenth Circuit have historically
tended to favor a strict view of fortuity and business risk principles.'
The Greystone decision may therefore have surprised observers who
expected the panel to rule for the carrier.
Greystone should not have come as a surprise. Although the case
gave the Tenth Circuit discretion to predict how the Colorado Supreme
Court would decide certain coverage issues, it ultimately required little
more than a traditional application of contract principles to effectuate the
intent of the parties. Implementing that analysis, the Tenth Circuit recognized that ISO drafters intended for builders' CGL insurance policies to
cover liability for property damage caused by defective work. It is oft
said but bears repeating: if the insurance industry wants to eliminate coverage for defective construction, it can easily do so. 72 It has not. On the
contrary, when given the opportunity, its drafters have elected to expand
coverage for construction defects, first by creating the Broad Form Property Damage endorsement in 1976 and later by incorporating the broad
form language into all standard CGL policies in 1986. Although some
opportunistic lawyers have argued that allowing CGL policies to cover
negligent workmanship improperly converts insurance policies into performance bonds, any such similarity is not the work of activist judges. As
one court succinctly stated, "[w]e have not made the policy closer to a
performance bond for general contractors, the insurance industry has." 7 3
The fact that the insurance industry has made this choice likely reflects simple principles of supply and demand: so long as builders are
willing to pay premiums for protection from liability for defective work,
insurance companies will be willing to sell them an appropriate product.
The system only breaks down when a carrier collects a builder's preminot been physically injured. See Rawls, supra note 166 (discussing Clear, LLC v. Am. & Foreign
Ins. Co., No. 3:07-cv-001 IOJWS, 2008 WL 818978 (D. Alaska Mar. 24, 2008)). The U.S. District
Court for the District of Western Oklahoma recently applied this approach in a case with similar
facts to Colorado Pool when it found coverage under a concrete supplier's policy for repairs to
nondefective components of a bridge that had to be ripped out in the course of replacing substandard
concrete. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grayson, No. CIV-07-917-C, 2008 WL 2278593, at *6
(W.D. Okla. May 30, 2008).
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that the ISO recently published an optional endorsement eliminating the subcontractor exception to
the "your-work" exclusion for builders who do not wish to purchase such coverage).
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2013]

INSURING RISK OF CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS

645

ums but refuses to honor the policy when the builder files a large
claim.174 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Greystone makes clear that
Colorado law does not permit this, and that builders and homeowners can
expect Colorado state and federal courts to enforce CGL provisions that
cover property damage resulting from construction defects.

174.
See Abraham, supra note 4, at 103 (discussing the economics of insurance and noting that
policyholders "now speak facetiously about an implied 'big claim' exclusion in CGL policies, referring to the perceived tendency of commercial insurers to deny any substantial claim by asserting
what policyholders regard as questionable policy defenses").

